

TESTIMONY OF
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, JAMES FORRESTAL
BEFORE THE
SENATE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE
TUESDAY, MARCH 18, 1947

What I say in this statement on the bill to unify and integrate our departments for national security is based on two main premises:

First, there is a need, apparent during and since the war, for the planned integration of all the elements, energies and forces in our nation which have to be drawn upon to wage successful war. In these categories come not merely the Army and Navy and the State Department but industry, labor, transportation, civilian economy, and not least important, a study of raw materials and stock-piling of those basic materials which in wartime have to be imported in greatly increased quantities.

Second, nothing in any plan for the unification or consolidation of the purely military elements of our national security system should destroy the morale and autonomy of the Navy and its components, including particularly the Fleet Marine Forces and naval aviation. The identity of the Naval Service, with all of the considerations of morale and corps spirit involved, must be preserved.

The character of modern war is global and the Navy's point of view is essential in the conduct of a global war. I believe that had the status of the Navy in the war recently ended not been that of an equal partner, it is probable that the Pacific operations would have continued long beyond August 14, 1945. Naval insistence that the Pacific War be vigorously waged concurrently with the struggle in Europe enabled the United States and her allies to compel the surrender of Japan within three and a half months after the fall of Germany.

Having stated these premises I will proceed with discussion of the bill now before you.

Both the War and Navy Departments, after the end of World War II, recognized the need for bringing our security organization into consonance with the demands of our international position and of modern warfare. Differences dealt not with the ultimate objective but as to the method of achieving it.

Those differences have been resolved. The War and Navy Departments are in agreement that the bill before you, considered in its entirety, is a sound and workable accommodation between three points of view:

One, of the Army -- that there should be a single department in which the three services -- Air, Navy and Ground Forces -- should be divisions or branches;

Two, of the Air Forces -- that they were entitled to be placed on a parity with the other two older services;

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled,

DECLARATION OF POLICY

calibre. To accomplish these objectives, a central intelligence agency is
required by the United States. This agency shall insure the production of
the foreign intelligence necessary to enable the appropriate officials of the
Government to be informed fully in their dealings with other nations, and to
enable these officials to formulate national policies and plans which this
Government is to pursue in order to avert future armed conflicts and ensure
the common defense and security of the United States. The accomplishment of
this service comprises the national intelligence objectives of the United States.

Experience preceding, during, and following two World Wars has
proven that the uncoordinated decentralization of the collection, research,
and dissemination of foreign intelligence information among many departments
and agencies of the Government is unsatisfactory. In an attempt to remedy this
situation in times of national crises, emergency means have repeatedly been
adopted. These experiences have shown the need for a permanent, centralized,
intelligence agency so that all the foreign intelligence sources and facilities
of the Government may be utilized to the fullest extent in the production of
foreign intelligence, and so that their greatest potentialities may be
realized most efficiently and economically, with a resultant elimination of
unproductive duplication and unnecessary overlapping of functions in the

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